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Philosophers of religion have distinguished bHWZHHQµQHJDWLYH¶DQGµSRVLWLYH¶DWKHLVP. 
This essay considers further conceptions of atheism, especially the idea that atheism 
can facilitate a faith in God purified of idolatrous assumptions. After introducing 
%XOWPDQQ¶VFontention WKDWD µFRQVFLRXVDWKHLVW¶FDQ ILQGVRPHWKLQJ WUDQVFHQGHQW LQ
the world, this contention is interpreted through reflection on 5LFRHXU¶Vclaim that the 
atheisms of Nietzsche and Freud serve to mediate a transition to a purified faith ± a 
faith involving heightened receptivity to agapeic love. The troubling question of what 
differentiates atheism from belief in God is then discussed in the light of Simone 
:HLO¶VPHGLWDWLRQV RQ*RG¶Vsecret presence. 
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[A]theism may take a variety of different forms. The varieties, however, are more diverse 
than is dreamt of in the pages of many philosophical journals and texts. (Stewart 
Sutherland)1 
 
1%H\RQGµSRVLWLYH¶DQGµQHJDWLYH¶DWKHLVP 
HoZHYHUVFHSWLFDOZHPLJKWEHDERXW WKHSXUSRUWHGQHZQHVVRI WKH µ1HZ$WKHLVP¶ LW FDQ
hardly be denied that its vociferous representatives have given new prominence, if not 
necessarily new sophistication, to debates over atheism both inside and outside the 
contemporary academy.2 A common problem with such debates is a tendency to suppose that 
we already know perfectly well what theism or belief in God is on the one hand, and what 
atheism is on the other. This supposition leads to oversimplification and an unduly 
constrained appreciation of the range of conceptual possibilities that exists.3 Moreover, given 
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its potential to prematurely close off possibilities both of belief and of unbelief, which might 
otherwise be realized LQ SHRSOH¶V OLYHV LW LV LPSHUDWLYH WKDW WKH VXSSRVLWLRQ LQ TXHVWLRQ EH
scrutinized and challenged.  
There is, of course, an obvious sense in which atheism stands in opposition to belief in 
God. Indeed, one might say that it is true by definition, and hence trivially true, that atheism 
DQGEHOLHILQ*RGDUHRSSRVHGWRRQHDQRWKHU$IWHUDOOLIZHWDNHµWKHLVP¶WRPHDQµEHOLHILQ
*RG¶DQGµD-¶WREHDQHJDWLQJSUHIL[WKHQa-theism must be something that stands opposed to 
belief in God. Or must it? In fact, the negative prefix is ambiguous, allowing µDWKHLVP¶ to 
mean either absence of a belief in God or belief that there is no God. Some philosophers, 
IROORZLQJ $QWRQ\ )OHZ KDYH GHVLJQDWHG WKHVH µQHJDWLYH DWKHLVP¶ DQG µSRVLWLYH DWKHLVP¶
respectively.4 In view of this distinction, we might want to say that it is really only positive 
atheism that stands in opposition to belief in God. Negative atheism, meanwhile, merely 
occupies a neutral territory, wherein belief in God is neither endorsed nor explicitly opposed. 
So perhaps there is an REYLRXVVHQVHLQZKLFKVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVGHVLJQDWHGµDWKHLVP¶VWDQGV
in opposition to belief in God, while there is also another sense of the term that does not 
involve a straightforward relation of opposition. 
Having begun to notice that there are different types of atheism, it becomes worth asking 
ZKHWKHUµSRVLWLYHDWKHLVP¶DQGµQHJDWLYHDWKHLVP¶VXFFHHGLQFDSWXULQJDOOWKHYDULHWLHVWKHUH
are. Many who have thought carefully about the issue have maintained that these two 
categories are not exhaustive. The purpose of this essay is to examine some of the further 
categories that have been proposed, elucidating them by bringing into dialogue pertinent 
ideas from several major twentieth-century European thinkers, most notably Rudolf 
Bultmann, Paul Ricoeur and Simone Weil. An especially rich and surprising, and yet 
underexplored, contention that emerges from the work of these authors in particular is that 
atheism of a certain sort can facilitate a deepening and purification of faith. Without seeking 
to positively advocate the mode of faith arrived at by way of such a purificatory process, my 
task is to make a case for its intelligibility and, moreover, its spiritual profundity as one 
among other possibilities of sense.5 Making this case will require, crucially, calling into 
question any naïve assumptions that an uncomplicated binary opposition obtains between 
atheism and belief in God. 
 
2. Atheism and the transcendent 
A point that has often been noted ± but is still all-too-easily overlooked by philosophers of 
UHOLJLRQZKRXVHKRPRJHQL]LQJWHUPVVXFKDVµVWDQGDUGWKHLVP¶± is that there are as many 
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varieties of atheism as there are types of belief in God (or gods).6 It is common for people to 
believe in the God of one religion while not merely refraining from believing in other gods 
but positively disbelieving in them. Thus the same individual can be a believer in God with 
respect to one religion (or with respect to one conception of God) and an atheist with respect 
to the gods of other religions (or with respect to other conceptions of God).7 In other words, 
someone can be both a believer in God and a positive atheist at the same time. There is, of 
course, no contradiction here, because the attitudes of belief and disbelief are not being 
directed at the same object. This indicates that the categories of positive atheism and belief in 
God are not mutually exclusive. However, it does not show us that they, along with negative 
atheism, are not jointly exhaustive. 
More interesting than the fact that one can be both an atheist (in a certain respect) and a 
believer in God is the fact that some religious believers have asserted that atheism can be 
positively beneficial, and perhaps even essential, in promoting a deeper mode of faith or at 
least in preventing one from slipping into shallow or idolatrous modes. What is meant by this 
is not necessarily that one must become an atheist ± perhaps temporarily or merely partially ± 
in order to, as it were, come out the other side with a deeper faith. But it does mean that faith 
in God can be deepened through taking certain forms of atheism extremely seriously and 
coming to recognize that the conception of God rejected by those forms of atheism is one that 
ought also to be rejected by the person of faith. In this respect, as the nineteenth-century 
)UHQFKSKLORVRSKHUDQGSV\FKRORJLVW-XOHV/DJQHDXSXWLWµ$WKHLVPLVWKHVDOWWKDWSUHYHQWV
IDLWKLQ*RGIURPEHLQJFRUUXSWHG¶8 This idea of atheism as a safeguard against a corrupted 
or superficial faith is a theme that emerges in the thought of several modern theologians and a 
few philosophers who are familiar with recent theological thought. In this section I shall 
FRQVLGHU5XGROI%XOWPDQQ¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKHUH LV D W\SHRI DWKHLVP WKDW LV YHU\ FORVH Wo 
genuine Christian faith insofar as it is capable of seeking and finding something transcendent 
within the world. 
Bultmann makes a distinction similar to that between positive and negative atheism, 
LQVWHDG XVLQJ WKH WHUPV µFRQVFLRXV¶ DQG µXQFRQVFLRXV¶ DWKeism.9 In common with certain 
other theologians, Bultmann sees the principal threat to religious faith within society as 
coming from unconscious atheism, which consists in an indifference not only to questions of 
religion but to vital existential questions more generally.10 %XOWPDQQ¶VQRWLRQRI FRQVFLRXV
DWKHLVPDSSHDUVRQWKHIDFHRILWWREHOLNH)OHZ¶VSRVLWLYHDWKHLVP%XW%XOWPDQQLGHQWLILHV
two varieties of conscious atheism, and one of these comes close to being a kind of faith, if 
not in God then at least in a transcendent something. The first type of conscious atheism ± 
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perhaps the most straightforward type ± FRQVLVWV LQ µWKH FDWHJRULFDO GHQLDO RI WKH UHDOLW\RI
*RGDVWKLVLVHQFRXQWHUHGLQFKXUFKGRJPDWLFV¶11 Bultmann, being hardly a neutral observer 
in the discussion, associates this type of atheism with a nihilistic loss of values. He cites with 
DSSURYDOERWK WKHGHFODUDWLRQRI1LHW]VFKH¶VPDGPDQWKDW WKHGHDWKRI*RGDPRXQWV WR WKH
ZLSLQJDZD\RIWKHKRUL]RQRIYDOXHVDQG-HDQ3DXO5LFKWHU¶VDVVHYHUDWLRQWKDWµ1RRQHLVVR
YHU\ DORQH LQ WKH XQLYHUVH DV WKH RQH ZKR GHQLHV *RG¶12 This aloneness involves, as 
Bultmann and Richter see it, a casting adrift of the individual self, away from the stability of 
eternal values. Those who consciously embUDFH )OHZ¶V VW\OH RI SRVLWLYH DWKHLVP ZRXOG
typically not concede that it inevitably results in such a disastrous separation from ethical or 
existentially viable values, and many religious thinkers would concur with the atheists on this 
point. But it is not my purpose to pursue that particular contention here.13 
Bultmann is more sympathetic to the second type of conscious atheism that he describes, 
even expressing some uncertainty over whether it counts as atheism at all. Like the nihilistic 
atheism, it rejeFWVµWKHGRJPDWLFGRFWULQHRI*RGZKLFKXQGHUVWDQGVKLPDVDEHLQJ¶14 But 
WKLV LQ LWVHOI LV LQVXIILFLHQW WR LQGLFW LW LQ %XOWPDQQ¶V H\HV ,QGHHG DV LV ZHOO NQRZQ
Bultmann himself maintained that a good deal of mainstream Christian discourse is 
overburdened by mythological narratives that ought to be pruned away in order to allow the 
true message of Christ to be properly comprehended in our contemporary world.15 Thus, 
insofar as atheism stands opposed to what he sees as the outdated mythology of institutional 
religion, Bultmann feels a closer affinity with it than with much of what goes by the name of 
Christianity. In particular, he considers atheists to be right in rejecting a God conceived of as 
standing outside the world; paraphrasing Dietrich Bonhoeffer %XOWPDQQ DVVHUWV WKDW µthe 
transcendent is to be sought and can be found not above or beyond the world, but in the midst 
of this world.¶16 
The non-nihilistic conscious atheist described by Bultmann is capable of sharing with the 
genuine Christian an acknowledgement of a transcendent reality, and of seeking its presence 
in the world as opposed to outside it. It is for this reason that Bultmann is doubtful whether 
µDWKHLVP¶ LV TXLWH WKH ULJKW GHVLJQDWLRQ KHUH17 Unlike in the case of nihilistic atheism, 
however, Bultmann offers little in the way of examples or elaboration. In one place he invites 
the reader to see what John Robinson, in Honest to God, has written about Julian Huxley and 
Albert Camus,18 EXW LW LV TXHVWLRQDEOH ZKHWKHU 5RELQVRQ¶V WH[W UHDOO\ VHUYHV %XOWPDQQ¶V
purpose. For Robinson does not cite Huxley and Camus to illustrate how an atheist might be 
said to seek the transcendent within the world or the unconditioned within the conditioned; he 
cites them in order to draw a contrast with the Christian outlook. Admittedly, in the case of 
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Huxley, Robinson sees a parallel between his rejection of supernaturalism and that of 
%RQKRHIIHU %XW 5RELQVRQ WKHQ SURFHHGV WR FRQWUDVW &KULVWLDQ IDLWK ZLWK +X[OH\¶V
µ(YROXWLRQDU\+XPDQLVP¶E\REVHUYLQJ WKDW µ)RU WKHKXPDQLVW WREHOLHYH LQD³UHOLJLRQRI
ORYH´LVWRDIILUPWKHFRQYLFWLRQWKDWORYHought to be the last word about life, and to dedicate 
RQHVHOI WRVHHLQJ WKDW LWHYHU\ZKHUHSUHYDLOV¶ZKHUHDV IRU WKH&KULVWLDQ LW LV WRDIILUPµQRW
simply that love ought to be the last word about life, but that, despite all appearances, it is¶19 
In the case of Camus, Robinson quotes from the ending of his novel The Outsider to 
DJDLQLOOXVWUDWHDYLHZSRLQWWKDWWKRXJKVLPLODUWR%RQKRHIIHU¶VLQRQHUHVSHFWLVVWULNLQJO\
dLIIHUHQWLQDQRWKHU:KLOHWKHSULVRQHULQ&DPXV¶VQRYHODQG%RQKRHIIHULQKLVSULVRQOHWWHUV
HDFKDFNQRZOHGJHVKLVVLWXDWLRQWREHRQHLQZKLFKµWKHFRQVRODWLRQVRIUHOLJLRQ>«@ are dead 
EH\RQGUHFDOO¶%RQKRHIIHUH[HPSOLILHVWKHµ&KULVWLDQ >«@ who in that situation still knows 
WKDW ³KRPH´ LV &KULVW DQG WKDW WR EH ³LQ KLP´ LV WR OD\ KLPVHOI RSHQ QRW WR WKH EHQLJQ
indifference, but to the divine agapeRI WKHXQLYHUVH¶20 So, with reference both to Huxley 
and to Camus, what Robinson is primarily doing is shRZLQJKRZWKH&KULVWLDQ¶VDIILUPDWLRQ
of the ultimate nature of the universe as love ± DORYHRIWKHNLQGWKDWLVµGLVFORVHGLQWKHOLIH
GHDWKDQGUHVXUUHFWLRQRI-HVXV&KULVW¶± is starkly at odds with those conceptions of reality 
that are available to the atheistic humanist, who can, at most, affirm a willingness to promote 
love despite the indifference of the world. 
What, then, does Bultmann mean when he asserts that the conscious atheist can seek and 
find the transcendent within the world? Our response to this question can be deepened if we 
return to it after reflecting upon a discussion by Paul Ricoeur of the benefits to be gained 
from engaging with the critiques of faith offered by Nietzsche and Freud. 
 
3. From accusation and consolation to the love of God 
Railing against the supposed consolations of religious faith is a potent theme of certain atheist 
critiques. Yet it can also be a feature of a conception of faith itself. We see this in 
%RQKRHIIHUIRUH[DPSOHDQGDOVRLQ5LFRHXU8VLQJWKHWHUPµUHOLJLRQ¶WRGHQRWHµDSULPLWLYH
structure of life >«@ which is grounded in the fear of punishment and the desire for 
SURWHFWLRQ¶21 Ricoeur contrasts this with a faith ± DµWUDJLFIDLWK¶± of the sort exemplified in 
the Hebrew and Babylonian wisdom literature, especially the Book of Job.22 Such a faith is 
one that rejects both the notion of God as a divine accuser, rewarding the righteous and 
condemning sinners, and the notion of God as a source of consolation, whose providential 
power will ensure that everythLQJ WXUQVRXW IRU WKHEHVW ,W LV µWUDJLF¶ LQ WKHVHQVH WKDW LW LV
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faith in the face of tragedy ± in the face of the recognition that, not only do things not always 
turn out for the best, but they often turn out horrendously. 
Ricoeur sees atheism ± in particular the atheisms of Nietzsche and Freud ± as potentially 
mediating between the stale religion of accusation and consolation and a revived and purified 
tragic faith.23 $FFRUGLQJ WR 5LFRHXU MXVW DV 1LHW]VFKH UHMHFWV WKH µJRG RI PRUDOLW\¶
µFRQFHLYHGDVWKHRULJLQDQGIRXQGDWLRQRIDQHWKLFVRISURKLELWLRQDQGFRQGHPQDWLRQ¶24 so 
should the person of faith reject such a god; and just as Freud rejects the image of God as a 
fatherly protector, so again should this be rejected by the person of faith.25 
Like Robinson, Ricoeur understands the characteristic of true faith that carries it beyond 
WKHVHDWKHLVWGHQLDOVWREHLWVDIILUPDWLRQRIORYH:KLOH1LHW]VFKHDIILUPVµWKHORYHRIIDWH¶
(amor fati&KULVWLDQLW\RUµWKH-XGHR-&KULVWLDQIDLWK¶DIILUPVµD ORYHRIFUHDWLRQ¶7KLVORYH
LV 5LFRHXU DGPLWV µD IRUP RI FRQVRODWLRQ¶ EXW LW LV RQH WKDW µGHSHQGV RQ QR H[WHUQDO
FRPSHQVDWLRQ¶ DQG VR WRR LV LW IUHH RI µDQ\ IRUP RI YHQJHDQFH¶ LQFOXGLQJ WKH UHVLGXDO
YHQJHDQFHWKDWRQ5LFRHXU¶VYLHZSHUVLVWVLQ1LHW]VFKH¶VµDFFXVDWLRQRIDFFXVDWLRQ¶26 µ/RYH
ILQGVZLWKLQLWVHOILWVRZQFRPSHQVDWLRQLWLVLWVHOIFRQVRODWLRQ¶27 
John Robinson, as we have seen, distinguishes Christian faith from the atheism of 
&DPXV¶VSULVRQHUDQGIURPWKHKXPDQLVPRI-XOLDQ+X[OH\E\Hmphasizing its perception of 
WKHXQLYHUVHDVLPEXHGZLWKORYH7KHPRYHPHQWVRI5LFRHXU¶VWKRXJKWDUHKDUGHUWRIROORZ
not least because he relies heavily on a complex analogy between the writing of a poem and 
the broader sense of SRLƝVLV as an act of (divine) creation.28 'UDZLQJ XSRQ +HLGHJJHU¶V
UHIOHFWLRQVRQDSRHPE\+|OGHUOLQ5LFRHXUFRQWHQGVWKDWSRHWU\FDQHQDEOHXVµWRGZHOORQ
earth >«@ ZKHQ>RQH¶V@QRUPDOUHODWLRQVKLSWRODQJXDJHLVUHYHUVHGZKHQODQJXDJHVSHDNV¶
µ7KXV¶KHFRQWLQXHVµPDQUHVSRQGVWRODQJXDJHE\OLVWHQLQJWRZKDWLWVD\VWRKLP¶29 In the 
FRQWH[WRI5LFRHXU¶VGLVFXVVLRQDVDZKROHRQHZD\RIUHDGLQJWKLVLVDVWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW
poetry, though it is a creative activity, can be understood as an act of creation that happens 
through WKH SRHW UDWKHU WKDQ E\ PHDQV RI WKH SRHW¶V LQGLYLGXDO ZLOO LQVWHDG RI DV LW ZHUH
stamping her will upon the world, the poet becomes a conduit for the breath of inspiration. 
$QDORJRXVO\ RQ WKLV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ ZKHQ RQH¶V DFWLYLW\ LQ WKH ZRUOG LV XQderstood as the 
DFWLYLW\ RI *RG¶V :RUG WKHQ RQH EHFRPHV D YHKLFOH IRU WKH GLYLQH ZLOO RQ HDUWK30 This 
analogy, taken on its own, falls short of the idea that the nature of the divine will, and hence 
of creation itself, is love. But it nevertheless conveys the thought that when the divine will is 
conceived of as love, and RQHRSHQVXS WR LWVEHLQJ WKHGLYLQHZLOODQGQRWRQH¶VRZQWKDW
RXJKWWREHGRQHµRQHDUWKDVLWLVLQKHDYHQ¶WKHQRQHPD\ILQGRQHVHOIWREHDSDUWLFLSDQW
LQ*RG¶VORYHRQHSDUWLFLSates in the love of God to the extent that one is receptive to it. This 
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LVDZD\RIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ*RGDVRQHFRPPHQWDWRUKDVSXWLWDVµDEVROXWHORYHUDWKHUWKDQ
DEVROXWH DXWKRULW\¶31 No longer is surrendering to God construed as obedience to a tyrant 
who will punish you in this world or the next if you fail to conform to his dictates; instead, it 
becomes an acceptance of self-effacing love ± agápƝ ± DFWLQJWKURXJKWKHPHGLXPRIRQH¶V
own humanity. 
:LWK 5LFRHXU¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH ORYH RI *RG LQ YLHZ ZH FDQ see a plausible way of 
understanding what Bultmann has in mind when he speaks of seeking and finding the 
transcendent within the world. At one place, Bultmann introduces the notion of the 
µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVRI*RG¶E\SURSRVLQJ WKDW WKLVQRWLRQKDV WHQGHG Wo be concealed, both in 
&KULVWLDQLW\DQGLQRWKHUWUDGLWLRQVµLQWKHP\WKRORJLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHPHWDPRUSKRVLV
of the deity or of gods, who visit a mortal incognito DQGXQUHFRJQL]HG¶32 To illustrate this 
theme in the Christian tradition, Bultmann cites the parable of the sheep and the goats 
(Matthew 25:31±46), wherein Jesus distinguishes between those who gave food to the 
hungry, drink to the thirsty, shelter to the homeless and so on, and those who did none of 
these things. Since, in the discourse, Jesus identifies himself with the one who is in need of 
nourishment, shelter, etc., Bultmann sees in it an illustration of the doctrine of the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVRI*RGDGGLQJWKDWLWDOVRLOOXVWUDWHVWKHGRFWULQHRIµWKHSUHVHQFHRIHWHUQLW\
LQ WLPH¶33 By this, Bultmann may simply mean that the depiction of Jesus as the one who 
was in need illustrates both of these doctrines. But another way of reading the point is to see 
eternity as entering into time not merely in the person of the one who needs help, but in the 
acts of benevolence that are bestowed upon that person. To perceive an act of selfless 
benevolence in these terms is, we might say, to perceive it as a miracle ± without thereby 
implying that it defies any law of nature. This is, in fact, close to 6LPRQH :HLO¶V
understanding of the parable. But she goes further and proposes that Christ is present 
primarily in the one who gives and only secondarily in the one who receives. µ7KHWH[WRIWKH
*RVSHOLVFRQFHUQHGRQO\ZLWK&KULVW¶VSUHVHQFHLQWKHVXIIHUHU¶VKHZULWHV 
 
Yet it seems as though the spiritual worthiness of him who receives has nothing to do 
with the matter. It must then be admitted that it is the benefactor himself, as a bearer of 
Christ, who causes Christ to enter the famished sufferer with the bread he gives him.34 
   
Although atheists are precluded from perceiving acts of benevolence of the sort alluded to 
in the parable of the sheep and the goats as instances of divine love, there is nothing to 
prevent their performing such acts under a different description. If, therefore, one grants that 
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these acts can be described as something transcendent or unconditioned, then there is room 
IRUDFNQRZOHGJLQJ%XOWPDQQ¶VSRLQW WKDW LW LVSRVVLEOHIRUDWKHLVWVRIDFHUWDLQVRUW WRVHHN
and find transcendence within the finite world. Drawing this conclusion more explicitly than 
%XOWPDQQ5RELQVRQUHPDUNVWKDWWKHµXWWHURSHQQHVVLQORYHWRWKH³RWKHU´IRUKLVRZQVDNH¶
ZKLFKLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\WKHSDUDEOHLQTXHVWLRQLVµWKHRQO\DEVROXWHIRUWKHQRQ-ChrLVWLDQ¶DV
well as for the Christian.35 µ+HPD\QRWUHFRJQL]H&KULVWLQWKH³RWKHU´EXWLQVRIDUDVKHKDV
responded to the claim of the unconditional in love he has responded to him ± for he is the 
³GHSWK´RIORYH¶36 The suggestion here is not that there is nothing to distinguish the Christian 
from the non-Christian: it remains true that the Christian recognizes something that the non-
Christian does not; namely, the fact that Christ is the depth of love. Even so, the suggestion 
from Robinson, and perhaps implicit in what Bultmann says, is that non-Christians, including 
atheists, need not be incapable of recognizing the depth of love: it is just that this depth will 
not be recognized as Christ ± and hence, as God. 
 
4. Purificatory atheism 
:H KDYH VHHQ WKHQ D ZD\ RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ %XOWPDQQ¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKHUH LV D W\SH RI
DWKHLVPWKDWLQYROYHVERWKDUHMHFWLRQRIWKH*RGRIµFKXUFKGRJPDWLFV¶DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPH
the capacity to find something transcendent, something unconditioned, in the midst of the 
world; the transcendence that is sought and found is ± or, at any rate, one of the things it can 
be is ± transcendent agapeic love. It is transcendent not in the quasi-spatial sense of being 
ORFDWHG µRXWVLGH¶ WKH XQLYHUVH EXW LQ WKH VHQVe of exceeding world-oriented values: it 
transcends, and is unconditioned by, anything that the agent could want for herself. To that 
extent, it becomes feasible to describe the source of benevolent love not so much as the will 
of the agent herself; rather, it derives from somewhere so deep that, in contrast with actions 
motivated by self-regarding ends, the self becomes a vehicle for and a participant in its 
expression, without being the originator or creator of the act.37 These modes of description 
are available to the atheist. What remains unavailable is the perception of the love that 
inspires and flows through the action as the love of God, an encounter with God. From the 
Christian perspective, this perception is something that the atheist is missing; yet the 
Christian who responds to the call of God in the way illustrated in the parable of the sheep 
and the goats is apt to feel a stronger affinity with an atheist who responds with love in 
comparable situations, than with those who, while professing to be Christians, fail to heed the 
call. 
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Therefore, what we find in Bultmann, and in Robinson and Ricoeur, is a conception of 
faith not as assent to a proposition or set of propositions, but as constituted by a certain 
perception of reality and a readiness to act in ways that flow from that perception. To express 
the point in these terms need not be to strip faith of conceptual content or doctrinal 
commitment. As Mark Wynn has recently argued, the concepts articulated in doctrinal claims 
may themselves inform and make possible a renewal of sensory perception and emotional 
feeling.38 It is, however, to place the emphasis squarely on the roles of ethical receptivity and 
responsiveness in constituting a resolutely faithful mode of life.39   
If we turn now to some furtKHUWKRXJKWVRI6LPRQH:HLO¶VZHshall find there ideas that, 
though often paradoxical on the surface, become more intelligible in the light of 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVEURXJKWIRUZDUGVRIDUµ7KHUHDUH¶VKHZULWHVµWZRVRUWVRIDWKHLVPRQHRI
which is a purificDWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQRI*RG¶40 $VRQHFRPPHQWDWRUKDVREVHUYHGµ7KHUHDUH
RIFRXUVHPRUHDWKHLVPVWKDQWZR%XWEHKLQG6LPRQH:HLO¶VUHPDUNOLHVDQDZDUHQHVVWKDW
atheism may be prophetic against the illusions of religious belief and behaviour, and that as 
VXFK LWPD\EHFDWKDUWLF¶41 Although Weil does not spell out in her remark what the other 
sort of atheism is, we know from things she says elsewhere that she had strong misgivings 
about the sort of materialistic atheism espoused by Marxists and other revolutionary thinkers 
or activists in her day, and also about the scientism ± WKH µRYHUO\ ]HDORXV UHYHUHQFH IRU
VFLHQFH¶42 ± that she saw around her. We can, then, reasonably surmise that the contrast she is 
making is between an idolatrous atheism that puts its faith in such things as technological 
progress or the revolutionary struggle, and another sort that, as Ricoeur maintains, is capable 
of forming a bridge for crossing over from idolatrous religion to a purified faith. 
Like thinkers such as Meister Eckhart before her and Paul Tillich after her, Weil voiced 
WKH WKRXJKW WKDW VSHDNLQJ RI *RG DV µH[LVWLQJ¶ FDQ EH PLVOHDGLQJ43 She proposes, as a 
µPHWKRGRISXULILFDWLRQ¶SUD\LQJWR*RGµQRWRQO\LQVHFUHWDVIDUDVPHQDUHFRQFHUQHGEXW
with the thought that *RGGRHVQRWH[LVW¶44 Commenting on this remark, Gustave Thibon, the 
HGLWRURIDFROOHFWLRQRI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVQRWHVµ*RGGRHVQRWLQIDFWH[LVWLQWKHVDPHZD\DV
created things which form the only object of experience for our natural faculties. Therefore, 
FRQWDFW ZLWK VXSHUQDWXUDO UHDOLW\ LV DW ILUVW IHOW DV DQ H[SHULHQFH RI QRWKLQJQHVV¶45 The 
LQFOXVLRQRIWKHSKUDVHµDWILUVW¶KHUHPLJKWEHWDNHQWRLPSO\WKDWDVRQH¶VVSLULWXDODFXLW\LV
UHILQHGLWWKHQEHFRPHVSRVVLEOHWRHQFRXQWHURUIHHO*RG¶VVupernatural reality as something 
other WKDQQRWKLQJQHVV%XWWKLVGRHVQRWDSSHDUWREH:HLO¶VSRLQW)RU:HLOWKHSXULILFDWLRQ
that is brought about by acknowledging that God does not exist is not a prelude to replacing a 
false conception of God with one that is closer to the truth ± a more nuanced and accurate 
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conception that may then remain permanently in place as an object of love and worship. Her 
writings imply that any conception, merely insofar as it is a conception µan object in my 
mental world¶as Rowan Williams puts it46ZLOOUHPDLQFRQWDPLQDWHGE\RQH¶VRZQGHVLUHV
and aspirations. The believer in God must therefore always be on her guard in order to avoid 
the idolatry of supposing that she is capable of conceiving of God. 
The image that HPHUJHV IURP :HLO¶V WKRXJKW WKHUHIRUH LV WKDW RI D WHQVLRQ RU D ILQH
balance: the task of the spiritual life being to hold in balance a profound faith in and love of 
*RGZKLOH UHIUDLQLQJIURPLPSRVLQJDQ\SRVLWLYHGHVFULSWLRQXSRQ WKH*RG WRZKRPRQH¶V
love and faith are directed. It may be something akin to this thought that is expressed by 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ ZKHQ LQ D QRWHERRN HQWU\ IURP  KH GHVFULEHV µ7KH KRQHVW UHOLJLRXV
WKLQNHU¶ DV EHLQJ µOLNH D WLJKWURSH ZDONHU¶ µ,W DOPRVW ORRNV DV WKRXJK KH ZHUH walking on 
nothing but air. His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk 
RQ LW¶47 The support is so slender because, in the case of an honest and self-reflective 
religious thinker, the object of faith has been stripped down to its barest features; even the 
claim that God exists is in question, due to the risk of supposing God to be an entity 
alongside other existent things ± DµEHLQJ¶WKDWORYHVUDWKHUWKDQWKHGHSWKRIORYHLWVHOI48 
 
5. What, if anything, is the atheist missing? 
The foregoing discussion has brought into dialogue with one another ideas from several 
thinkers ± most notably Bultmann, Ricoeur, Robinson and Weil ± in order to elucidate a 
cluster of closely connected ways of conceptualizing the relationship between faith in God 
and certain types of atheism. Two of the main contentions to come out of this are the 
following. The first is that both the believer in God and the atheist are able to seek and find 
transcendence in the world ± in the act of selfless love ± but only the believer is able, or has 
the potential, to see such acts as instances of the presence of God, and only the believing 
Christian has the potential to see in them the presence of Christ. The second contention is that 
the purest kind of faith requires, and perhaps is partially constituted by, a variety of atheism: 
the believer in God performs a delicate balance between affirmation of God and recognition 
that even that affirmation runs the ever-present risk of degenerating into idolatry. 
In response to this discussion, an atheist might well be puzzled about what exactly she is 
allegedly missing out on. If there is a type of atheist who is fully able to engage in acts of 
benevolent love of the profoundest sort, then what is she lacking ± what is the extra quality 
that faith in God is supposed to bring? A Christian, following Robinson, might address this 
question by reaffirming that it is only the Christian who can recognize Christ as the depth of 
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love, the source from which the benevolent act derives, and who can see the universe as a 
whole, despite all the evil and suffering it contains, as an expression of that depth. Still, 
however, the atheist ± and indeed many believers in God ± may be left wondering what these 
forms of words are really saying: ZKDWGRHVLWPHDQWRµUHFRJQL]H&KULVWDVWKHGHSWKRIORYH¶
DQGWRVHHWKHXQLYHUVHDVDQµH[SUHVVLRQ¶RIWKDWORYH"+RZZRXOGRQHWHOOZKHWKHUVRPHRQH
even oneself, is in fact perceiving things in this way? 
It is far from clear what would count as a straightforward answer to these questions, or 
indeed what would count as any answer at all. If someone were to propose, for instance, that 
there must be some kind of phenomenological differentiator ± a qualitative shade of first-
personal experience that discloses the true nature of the universe to be love ± would this 
clarify anything? Or would it merely reiterate the claim that there is a difference between 
VHHLQJWKHXQLYHUVH¶VQDWXUHDVORYHDQGQRWVHHLQJWKLVZLWKRXWVD\LQJDQ\WKLQJXVHIXODERXW
what thaWGLIIHUHQFHFRQVLVWVLQRWKHUWKDQSHUKDSVµ<RX¶OONQRZLWZKHQ\RXVHHLW¶" 
A more meaningful answer would indicate how recognizing Christ as the depth of love in 
benevolent acts, and perceiving the nature of the universe as a whole to be love, affects the 
kind of life that the believer leads. In a letter to her spiritual adviser Father Perrin, Weil 
PDNHV VRPH SHUWLQHQW UHPDUNV FRQFHUQLQJ ZKDW VKH FDOOV µWKH LPSOLFLW ORYH RI *RG¶ 6KH
speaks of this as an implicit love because, she maintains, God cannot be a direct object of 
RQH¶VORYHRQHFDQORYH*RGRQO\LQGLUHFWO\LPSOLFLWO\WKURXJKWKHORYHRIREMHFWVLQZKLFK
µ*RG LV UHDOO\ WKRXJKVHFUHWO\SUHVHQW¶49 Weil initially cites three such objects ± µUHOLJLRXV
ceremonies, the beauty of the world and oXUQHLJKERXU¶± and then to these adds friendship, 
ZKLFK µVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJ >«@ LVGLVWLQFW IURPWKH ORYHRIRXUQHLJKERXU¶50 The mention of 
these objects, or phenomena, is helpful insofar as it begins to direct our attention away from 
the idea that there must be some specific experience, or quality of experience, that constitutes 
µVHHLQJ WKH XOWLPDWH QDWXUH RI WKH XQLYHUVH DV ORYH¶ DQG UHGLUHFWV LW WRZDUGV WKH OLIH DQG
activities of the believer as a whole, and perhaps to a range of attitudes displayed in that life. 
Again, however, there is no obvious reason why someone who does not believe in God 
should be precluded from appreciating the beauty of the world or from loving her neighbours 
(her fellow human beings) and participating in deep friendships. Of the objects, or activities, 
that Weil mentions, it seems to be only religious ceremonies that are more specific to the life 
of the believer. The crucial difference between the believer and the non-believer, it might be 
said, is that although each of them can love the world, neighbour and friend ± and can even, 
to some extent, partake in religious ceremonies ± it is only the believer who can love God 
through or by means of these indirect forms; it is only the believer who can understand acts of 
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selfless love as, themselves, sacraments. This difference of understanding is both 
conceptually and perceptually inflected: the act is conceived as being of God and directed 
towards God, and hence is perceived with a reverence that eludes the atheist. 
These attempts to refine the description of what distinguishes the believer from the one 
who, as an atheist, finds transcendent love within the world are, admittedly, tentative and 
imprecise. Their ultimate inadequacy reminds us that there may be no convenient way of 
characterizing the difference other than by looking at the details of particular lives, and hence 
that the difference may itself take different forms in different cases. Perhaps the skills of a 
novelist or biographer are needed, rather than (or in addition to) those of a theologian or 
philosopher, to bring out the qualities of a given form of life ± the qualities, for instance, that 
render it such as to be describable in terms of an awareness of the nature of the universe as 
love and of Christ as being the depth of love disclosed in acts of benevolence.51 
It might even be the case that such qualities can be revealed only through the physical 
presence of one who embodies them. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This essay has sought to problematize the assumption that atheism falls into two discrete 
FDWHJRULHVSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHZKLFKDUHH[KDXVWLYHRIDWKHLVP¶VSRVVLELOLWLHV:KHQRQH
looks beyond debates within much that goes by the name of philosophy of religion, and 
ventures into the thought of certain theologians and religious thinkers, one finds not only 
discussions of the nuances between a variety of atheisms, but also the intriguing suggestion 
that atheism of a certain sort can facilitate or perhaps even be partially constitutive of a 
deepened and purified faith in God. Ricoeur presents the role of atheism in this process as 
that of throwing into question the picture of God as an accusing punisher and granter of 
consoling compensation for the trials of OLIH7KHSHUVRQRIIDLWKRQ5LFRHXU¶VYLHZVKRXOG
concur with the likes of Freud and Nietzsche that these conceptions of God are, in the end, 
delusory projections, and should seek instead to recognize God as the love that flows through 
us in the moments when we participate in acts of beneficent creativity. This, I would add, is a 
normative theological averment that cannot be underwritten by philosophy, though 
philosophical analysis can assist in bringing out its integrity and intelligibility. 
Like Ricoeur, the other authors that I have discussed ± most notably, Bultmann, Robinson 
and Weil ± all in their own respective ways break down the idea of a sharp division between 
atheism and belief in God while nevertheless maintaining that there is something particular, 
something unique, about a purified faith. Articulating this difference remains a difficult task; 
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I have expressed scepticism that it can be done satisfactorily by means of the conceptual tools 
typically utilized by philosophers and theologians. There is, undoubtedly, something 
UHOLJLRXVO\SURIRXQGLQWKHWKRXJKWWKDWWKH&KULVWLDQDIILUPVµQRWVLPSO\WKDWORYHought to be 
the last word about life, but that, despite all appearances, it is¶ %XW QR PDWWHU KRZ PDQ\
times phrases such as this are reiterated, questions are liable to remain over exactly what is 
meant. There are no easy answers here, and I have suggested that, if answers are to be found, 
it may be only through attentiveness to the lives of those who manifest an awareness of the 
love of God, as revealed either in the works of great narrative authors or in life itself.52 
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Notes 
                                            
1
 Sutherland, Atheism and the Rejection of God, 1. 
2
 For critical discussion of New Atheism, see, for example, Haught, God and the New 
Atheism, and Amarasingam, Religion and the New Atheism. 
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3
 Among the exceptions to this oversimplifying trend is 0RRUH³9DULHWLHVRI6HQVH-0DNLQJ´
along with several of the other contributions to French and Wettstein, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 37ZKLFKLVDVSHFLDOLVVXHRQµ7KH1HZ$WKHLVPDQG,WV&ULWLFV¶. 
4
 See )OHZ³The Presumption of Atheism´ esp. 14. See also Martin, Atheism, passim, and 
³General Introduction´ 7KHVH XVHV RI µQHJDWLYH¶ DQG µSRVLWLYH¶ DWKHLVP ought not to be 
confused with an earlier usage coined by Jacques Maritain in his ³On the Meaning of 
Contemporary Atheism´ 
5
 0\XVHRIWKHSKUDVHµSRVVLELOLWLHVRIVHQVH¶RZHVPXFKWRWKHZRUNRI'=3KLOOLSV6HH
for example, Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplationµ7KHDLPRIWKH
hermeneutics of contemplation is [«] not a matter of apologetics, but of contemplating 
possibilities of sense. Whether those possibilities are appropriated, personally, is another 
PDWWHU¶&I %XUOH\³$SSURDFKHVWR3KLORVRSK\RI5HOLJLRQ´ 
6
 See, for example, +\PDQ³Atheism in Modern History´ 29; Turner, How to Be an Atheist, 
7KHWHUPµVWDQGDUGWKHLVP¶KDVEHHQHVSHFLDOO\SUHYDOHQWLQWKHZRUNRI:LOOLDP/5RZH 
See, for instance, 5RZH ³Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis´  DQG ³Friendly Atheism, 
Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil´ 83±84. This and similar terms have also been 
used by others, however. See, for example, /HIWRZ³Immutability´section 3; $QGUH³Was 
Hume an Atheist?´142. Although Rowe himself is patently DZDUHWKDWWKHUHDUHµYDULHWLHVRI
DWKHLVP¶ VHH most indicatively, Rowe, ³7KH 3UREOHP RI (YLO DQG 6RPH 9DULHWLHV RI
$WKHLVP´KLVDQGRWKHUV¶XQFULWLFDO DFFHSWDQFHRI WKHQRWLRQRI µVWDQGDUG WKHLVP¶ WHQGV WR
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